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# WORKING PAPER

**The Evolution of Global Cleavages: A  
Historical Analysis of Territorial and  
Functional World Alignments Based on  
Automated Text Analysis, 1843–2020**

Daniele Caramani, Siyana Gurova, Tobias Widmann



European University Institute  
**Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies**  
In the context of the ERC Advanced Grant GLOBAL,  
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### **Global Cleavages: The Shape of Political Conflict across World Regions in Historical Perspective – GLOBAL**

The ERC Advanced Grant project GLOBAL (ERC-2022-ADG, project number: 101097740) investigates cleavages at the global level. Treating the globe as one system, it analyses the cleavages that structure world politics and asks whether conflicts are shaped territorially or along functional alignments cutting across world regions. The long-term empirical analysis from the 19th century to the present aims to establish if, and under what conditions, international divisions opposing world regions – core-periphery, North-South, or civilisational contrasts – change and are replaced by conflict lines that oppose groups along economic, political-military and socio-cultural inequalities. This project on the globalisation of politics extends the PI's previous work on the nationalisation and Europeanisation of politics to the global level.



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## **Abstract**

This paper examines the global cleavages that structure world politics from the mid-19th century to the present. It develops the concept of cleavage applied at the global level and measures empirically how territorial divisions give way to the politicization of various types of inequality along functional lines cutting across world regions. Covering over 300,000 articles from *The Economist* between 1843 and 2020, the analysis applies semi-supervised computational text analysis based on word embeddings to capture the territoriality–functionality continuum in global discourse. This method allows testing the theoretical expectation that the territoriality in the politicization of global divisions has diminished historically. Results reveal a trend toward the de-territorialization since World War II, primarily for cleavages about social and economic inequality. Although spikes of territoriality re-appear during interstate wars throughout the entire period, surges of territoriality are temporary and do not reverse the historical trend towards prevailing cross-territorial divisions.

## **Keywords**

Global cleavages, territoriality, functionality, world regions, class, inequality, latent semantic scaling, text analysis.

## Introduction: The Globalization of Politics?

Debates about the nature of global divisions abound both in academia and in the broader public sphere as current political rivalries, economic competition and war seem to reverse global integration. While many actors and scholars see global cleavages as dominated by territorial divisions between unequal world regions – West vs East, core vs periphery, democracies vs autocracies, North vs South or between civilizational areas – others point to the increasingly functional nature of global oppositions, such as transnational class inequalities in income and education, oppositions between people and elites or inter-generational conflicts about values and policies that cut across territory.

However, a theory of political cleavages at the global level and a long-term empirical analysis have so far been lacking. This paper theorizes the politicization of global inequalities by extending cleavage theory to the global level. It then measures the transformation of the global cleavages that structure the geographical and ideological space of world politics empirically, adopting a long-term perspective from the Industrial and National Revolutions of the 19th century to the present. Using an untapped source of data, it tests whether the nature of global cleavages mainly consist in territorial oppositions between world regions or in transnational oppositions that cut across the global geography.

Cleavage theory, as opposed to the mapping of inequality and IR conflict analysis, has never been applied to the global level. It has been limited to institutionally fully-formed nation-states with their clear territorial and membership boundaries achieved through the processes of state formation and nation-building (Bendix 1964, Rokkan 1970). As part of this structuring process, which runs parallel to the removal of internal boundaries through economic, political and cultural integration, territorial divisions yielded to non-territorial ones (Caramani 2004, Chibber and Kollman 2004). The change from territorial to functional also took place in the incompletely formed European polity (Bartolini 2005, Caramani 2015). This paper goes a step further, extending cleavage theory to the global level, which is crucial not only for the present time but the whole era starting with industrialization, colonization and global trade in the 19th century. Cleavage theory is thus enhanced by considering the connections between issues, actors and publics across polities and world regions. This departs from recent work on cleavages that remains confined to separate domestic settings,<sup>1</sup> and goes against standard views about spatial tensions that the higher the level of aggregation, the higher the salience of cross-country differences in structuring conflict.

Global cleavages emerge from the politicization of unequal distributions of economic resources, political influence and socio-cultural status. Unequal distributions of these “rights” create territorial oppositions to different degrees and in various shapes over time. Insofar as cleavages are politicized inequalities – not simply unequal distributions as mapped by economic or sociological research – their framing in the global discourse is crucial. The theoretical expectation of a “globalization of politics”, which this paper analyses empirically, is that territoriality in the politicization of global inequalities fades and is progressively replaced by functionality, similarly to processes at the national and European levels. The long-term perspective makes it possible also to address the intermittent reactivation of territoriality, namely during wars.

Multiple disciplines have analysed global territoriality. World-systems theory (since Wallerstein 1974) and industrial and technological history identify core–periphery and North–South divisions, as well as colonial blocs (Landes 1969). The macro-historical tradition (Braudel 1993) and cultural and psychological approaches (Huntington 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Rokeach 1973, Eisenstadt 2006) identify “value maps”, “multiple modernities”, clashes of civilizations and contrasting East–West worldviews. Studies of global trade flows highlight divisions between creditor and debtor economies, and between rule makers and rule takers (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007), whereas institutional studies

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<sup>1</sup> See, among others, Kriesi et al. (2008), Hooghe and Marks (2018), and Gethin et al. (2022). See Beramendi (2012) for spatial analysis of inequality at national level.

and IR distinguish security blocs (Alker 1964, Holloway 1990) and democratic and autocratic regimes (Gartzke 2000, 2007, Bartels 2016). Territoriality also appears in “archipelago” shapes with local industrialization (Pomeranz 2000) and global metropolises (Barber 2014, Taylor 2003).

These approaches address a variety of distributive inequalities but they do not consider the ways in which they are politicized. Similarly, work on economic inequality (Bourguignon 2015, Milanovic 2016) focuses on factual inequality, therefore neglecting contestation and the way in which global inequalities are ideologically politicized into cleavages. While this literature contemplates class inequalities across regions, it does not analyse the politics of the de-territorialization of global divisions. The analysis of politicization is typically limited to territoriality “within” polities. This paper asks how actors and publics are opposed “between”, or create alliances “across”, borders worldwide.

Given its focus on the politicization of global inequality, the analysis relies on text data about the nature of global political oppositions. It applies semi-supervised automated text analysis in an innovative way on articles published in *The Economist* between 1843 and 2020, an English-speaking, global and continuous source of material on how cleavages are framed across historical phases and types of socio-economic, political and cultural inequality. Relying on a computational scaling technique (Latent Semantic Scaling), the analysis places articles on a territory–function dimension to show that, over the past 180 years, the territoriality of cleavages has been decreasing and gradually replaced by alignments that pit groups, rather than world regions, against one another. This method is established in the analysis of political oppositions and particularly suited for historical analysis, allowing to reach back in time.

The paper starts by theoretically extending cleavage theory to the international setting. The methodological section operationalizes the politicization of cleavages by applying semi-supervised automated text analysis to the territory–function continuum to explore a new source of data. The results section presents empirical evidence of de-territorialization in global politics since the mid-19th century and possible reversals toward new territorial divisions linked to international conflict. The conclusion addresses normatively the implications of global cleavage structures for global governance and points to future research.

## Territorial vs Functional Cleavages in World Politics

The analysis of global cleavages is concerned with contestation over inequalities that takes place increasingly between groups across polities and world regions. By extending cleavage theory to the global level, the approach in this paper challenges the notion that socio-economic, social and cultural structures should be analysed exclusively at the domestic level without looking at the connection between issues, actors and publics located in separate polities and world regions.

We define cleavages as oppositions between social groups about the distribution of resources or – at the most general level – “rights”. Cleavages are structural oppositions between various types of groups with competing preferences about the allocation of socio-cultural, political and economic rights. Social classes and casts, genders and generations, ethnicities, denominations and groups defined by their members’ sexual orientation fight over the distribution of different resources, from economic benefits and educational opportunities, to marriage and adoption rights, and the rights to vote and protest. Preferences about the degree to which unequally distributed rights should be corrected to be distributed more equally constitute political dimensions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The definition of cleavage incorporates the three elements Bartolini and Mair (1990) define as constitutive of political cleavages: (1) a structural social base, (2) group consciousness with cultural identities that give rise to solidarity, and (3) organizations representing conflicting claims.

Political cleavages are therefore not simply differences of identity and values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Huntington 1997), nor are they simply inequalities between groups (Wallerstein 1974, Milanovic 2016). While cleavages entail the structural element of the unequal distribution of some resource across groups, they become cleavages once they are politicized, i.e. when grievances about the distribution of such resources are voiced by actors with conflictual preferences. Groups' differential access to rights transforms into a political cleavage when actors contest their distribution and voice groups' demands that inequalities be corrected. An opposition, in the definition above, is therefore more than an inequality, and cleavages result from competing, opposing, discourses by actors that mobilize groups.

Cleavages arise "within" systems, i.e., polities with delimited spatial and membership boundaries that achieved a certain level of closure. The concept covers conflicts between groups and regions under conditions of shared sovereignty and thus is broader than the definition of interstate conflict in IR. In the terms introduced by Hirschman (1970), these are situations where "exit options" are not available. In non-market conditions like the state, exit options are territorial (secession and migration) (Finer 1974). Nation-states are the political units that have achieved the highest degree of territorial and membership closure through state formation (territorial boundaries) and nation-building (membership boundaries, or "loyalty"). Escaping state authority, for residents and members of such polities, is nearly impossible.<sup>3</sup> The transposition of Hirschman's exit-voice model to the state (Rokkan 1974a,b) explains the rise of both voice institutions and actors channelling grievances when exit options are reduced. The internal emergence of cleavages, as well as the development of institutions that channel competing demands, is a consequence of external territorial and membership closure. The reduction of exit options leads to voice. Accordingly, it is in integrated systems that cleavages emerge.

With no integrated supra-national polity and no authoritative value allocation, the global level presents conditions for the emergence of cleavages that are radically different from national systems and even the forming European political system.<sup>4</sup> To what extent can we speak of political cleavages at the global level? On the one hand, the politicization of inequality faces the challenge of not having decision-making institutions that could be used to voice grievances. On the other hand, in a context of sovereign nation-states, the conditions of closure and exit reduction are at the minimum.

Yet it is plausible that the world's supra-national political integration and economic interdependence, as well as its cultural homogenization and legal limitations on national sovereignty that combine with market constraints provide the conditions necessary for the emergence of global contestation over the unequal distribution of global resources (Viola 2020, Voeten 2021). In a world system, resources are distributed unequally and in a way that is conducive to conflict. While the world is not one political system, the distribution of resources is nonetheless unequal, creating the conditions for the emergence of cleavages. Processes of penetration into the "peripheries" of the globe create the conditions for the emergence of contestation. Through protracted economic and financial interdependence, political integration in international institutions and agencies, cultural homogenization, limitations on national sovereignty and regulatory convergence (Haggard and Kaufman 1992), a global closure of some sort is achieved, favouring the emergence of global cleavages.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between territory and function covers other areas in the social sciences beyond cleavages, from boundary building (Rokkan 1970), political and ethnic nations (Smith 1986, Brubaker 1992), geographical and social mobility (Lipset 1977), electoral representation and pillarized or interest-based channels (Lijphart 1968). Residence and membership citizenship (Bauböck 2005) is another instance of this distinction that was first formulated by Max Weber in his definition of a *politischer Verband*: "We say of a group of domination that it is a political *group* insofar as its existence and the validity of the norms are assured in a permanent way within a *territory*" (Weber 1978).

<sup>4</sup> On the transposition of this theory from the nation state to the European Union, see Flora (1999), Weiler (1999), Bartolini (2005), Ferrera (2005) and Caramani (2015).



Diverse areas of unequally distributed rights and resources can be politicized by discourse around them, from the unequal right to marriage to access to water. Marshall's (1964) typology of rights is useful to distinguish three broad areas of inequality whose politicization gives rise to cleavages:

*Social and cultural inequality*: cleavages over the extent to which personal rights and freedom of choice, such as expression of one's own culture and sexuality, marital and educational choices, decisions over one's own body, are unequally enjoyed.

- *Political inequality*: cleavages over the extent to which power and influence (military and diplomatic), but also political rights and civil rights in the form of participatory and expressive resources, are unequally distributed.
- *Economic inequality*: cleavages over the extent to which income, wealth, access to housing, health services, education and food, as well as exposure to economic (but also environmental and health) vulnerability are fairly distributed.

There are therefore parallels with cleavage theory at national level in phases of national centre–periphery tensions as well as for regional integration in Europe. As for the national and European level, closure and the formation global cleavages has to be understood as an evolution, a process of formation over time.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, progressive global integration can be expected to transform cleavages from territorial to functional, that is, between membership groups cutting across nations and world regions. Not only does global integration set the conditions for the politicization of cleavages, but it also promotes their transformation from territorial to functional.

The distinction between territoriality and functionality as two poles of a continuum is well established in cleavage theory, and can be traced back to Rokkan's grid (1970: 96–101) in which the territorial and membership axes are orthogonal. The grid is used to place cleavages according to their degree of territoriality. All cleavages take varying levels of territoriality depending on how groups distribute across space, and their degree of territoriality can vary over time. For example, at the national level the class cleavage used to be highly territorial (overlapping with urban–rural oppositions) but has become cross-local over time. Therefore, the analysis in this paper employs a continuum to measure global divisions over time. In the process of politicization, various forms of inequality can thus be framed more or less territorially or functionally. One can conceive of the unequal rights between men and women (in terms of pay or access to education) as a matter of more or less progressive world regions, or as a matter of women being discriminated against men everywhere, which creates a transnational solidarity between women irrespective of location. Similarly, one may contrast workers' rights in regions where laws guarantee their safety and protection, with regions where such laws do not exist, or alternatively contrast the parallel exploitation of workers by elites that takes place everywhere, which promotes global unity in the labour movement. On the other hand, specific forms on inequality tend by their very nature to be either more territorial (say, military or diplomatic resources) or functional (such as education).


The analysis in this paper is dynamic and measures the transformation over time of global divisions. Two perspectives can be used to conceptualize globalization of politics as the transformation from territoriality to functionality, i.e. a process of de-territorialization of global oppositions (Figure 1). The first perspective is “convergence”. This is a transformation of territorialized cleavages. These are configurations where certain world regions or polities have cleavages (say, group A versus group -A) that are absent in other world regions or different (group B versus group -B). Convergence means that cleavage structures across the world become similar. The second perspective is “linkage”. This is a transformation of territorial cleavages. These are configurations where regions that are not divided internally (or internal divisions are not politicized) are opposed (say, region 1 versus region 2).

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
<sup>5</sup> Nationalization has attracted scholarly interest since Schattschneider's (1960) pioneering study on the US (see Caramani 2004, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Morgenstern 2017). On Europeanization, see Caramani (2015).

**Figure 1 The evolution of global**

*Convergence perspective*



*Linkage perspective*



Unlike a territorialized cleavage, in a territorial cleavage the same group is divided territorially (group A versus group A between regions). Linkage means that they are replaced by cleavages between groups across regions.<sup>6</sup> But in this case, the transformation from territorial to functional means that similar groups in different regions “link”, i.e. collaborate and connect organizationally, offer financial support, emulate strategies and show solidarity. Linkage is more than similarity, although a functional similarity can evolve into linkage over time.

Territorialized, territorial and functional patterns are the result of different types of politicization, operated by actors and their ideologies, of unequally distributed rights and resources. Actors frame inequalities as unequally distributed resources either between territories or between groups across regions. Territorialized cleavages result from groups’ exclusive territorial claim when they politicize pre-modern cultural factors such as religion, language, history and civilization in ideologies like ethno-nationalism, fascism, but also “civilizational” or religious ideologies. Examples include Pan-Islamism, Zionism, Hindu nationalism, Kemalism and Make-America-Great-Again. Territorial cleavages are about the interests of a territory as a whole, a “realist” self-interest (as for colonialism and the control of national resources). One finds such politicization typically on topics like war, defence and military, and political influence and diplomacy. It opposes whole territories that are cohesive internally on a given right or resource. However, redistribution, too, can be framed in a territorial way as in developmentalism (the transfer of resources to other regions). Examples of actors, therefore, may include mercantilist ones but also aid organizations.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See Cox (1999) for this concept applied nationally.

<sup>7</sup> This way of framing global inequality is shown by analyses of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (Thérien 1999).

Functional cleavages politicize group oppositions that transcend territorial boundaries. Class, but also gender or generational groups, education and personal-orientation groups (sexual identities, subcultures) are mobilized and develop organizational linkages and solidarity bonds across regions. They are distributional between groups yet universally applicable. These are typically the grievances of left–right ideologies in actors such as social-democratic, liberal and conservative parties and transnational parties. Also inclusive ideologies that do not oppose groups or territories to one another, but favour values like nature and peace, as for environmentalist movements and pacifist NGOs, create winner and losers across borders. Accordingly, we expect the process of globalization of politics to be driven by social and economic topics dominating over military, political and cultural ones.

The process we call “globalization of politics” takes place when conflicts between world regions attenuate and give way to conflicts across world regions. It is the process whereby world politics moves from international to transnational. The following analysis measures the territoriality–functionality continuum of cleavages. Rather than structural inequality itself, it measures the territoriality of the politics of inequality and the cleavages it generates. We analyse descriptively and empirically the theoretically-based expectation of a de-territorialization trend by measuring the strength of the territoriality of discourse on global cleavages and its cross-cutting nature since the closure-enhancing patterns of industrialization, colonization and world trade in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.

## Text Data and Latent Semantic Scaling

The structural approaches based on trade and macro-economic indicators that economists and historians use do not capture the politicized nature of cleavages. Network analyses based on the dyadic relationships between countries (trade and aid, alliances and treaties, establishment of embassies, etc.) also fail to do so.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, cultural analyses based on world “maps” of values and attitudinal traits (based on national aggregates) disregard transnational cleavages that cut across world regions (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Welzel 2013). A cleavage-based approach that takes politicization into account and examines cross-regional cleavages may rely on roll-call data from global institutions or – if the goal is to go as far back in time as possible – text analysis.<sup>9</sup> The latter is the strategy adopted in this paper.

We use media discourse, more specifically, articles from *The Economist* published between 1843 and 2020, to operationalize the framing of world cleavages. We choose this specific source of text for several reasons. Our goal of identifying the nature of global cleavages over a long period of time in the broadest way possible leads us to focus on media, as opposed to texts from single actors. First, this source does not look directly at political actors’ discourse and can therefore be considered more objective. Media text is more likely to capture a fair balance of discourse by various actors. This media source is preferable to semi-official government outlets (such as *Foreign Affairs*) or outlets close to political parties for similar reasons. Second, it does not look directly at structural inequalities and can therefore be considered an indicator of politicization rather than structural inequalities. In this sense it fulfils the goal of capturing the either territorial or functional frame of political contestation.

Another advantage of this publication is that it provides global coverage and does so continuously for approximately 180 years. Its commentary and analysis of global events over nearly two centuries provide a unique lens to examine the evolution of global cleavages. The consistent quality and analytical rigour of *The Economist’s* editorials offer a stable and reliable dataset for examining shifts in global discourse. This “newspaper” (as the weekly defines itself) has existed throughout the period of interest to our research question, which covers the time of mass and class politics.

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<sup>8</sup> The variety of research strategies ranges from continuum and income traditions (Chase-Cunn et al. 2000, Terlouw 1992, Kentor 2000.), to network analyses (Van Rossem 1996) and hierarchical structures (Piana 2006, Serrano and Boguñá 2005).

<sup>9</sup> Scholars have used roll-call votes in supra-national assemblies to investigate international conflict lines (Russett 1966, Holloway 1990, Voeten 2000, Gartzke 2007, Dreher et al. 2008, Bailey and Voeten 2018).

*The Economist* also provides a more analytical perspective than other media outlets. Since the goal of the analysis is to investigate cleavage structures, an analytical perspective is preferable to mere journalistic reports of events. Its focus on international affairs, economics and politics allows covering global issues. It is uniquely positioned to document global events, given its worldwide access to information, resources and influence. *The Economist* offers a broad view on global affairs and can thus capture the “zeitgeist” of different historical periods. *The Economist* distinguishes itself as a media outlet that has consistently reflected and analysed events in successive epochs. The fact that it is published on a weekly rather than daily basis also reduces the risk of biases from daily events.

Geographically and culturally, *The Economist* offers a Western, and more specifically, an Anglo-Saxon or British perspective. Historically, it is a newspaper from the imperial capital for the British and colonial elites. Up to the present day, it is considered an elitist publication. As a comprehensive textual source covering the extensive period from the 19th century to the present, its analytical character means that it is necessarily a product of elite discourse. This has the obvious advantage of providing a more analytical perspective and global coverage. In addition, *The Economist* has established itself as a global newspaper with a wide readership beyond Britain. As for its elitist character, this is a feature of most text data. The advantage of this particular outlet is that this feature has not changed much over the more than 180 years of its existence.

In terms of ideology, *The Economist* declares a free-market position on economic issues and liberal-democratic positions on social, cultural and political issues. Does this specific vantage point affect the phenomenon the analysis attempts to capture? While it may be a source of bias of the position on ideological dimensions such as left–right, a particular cultural or ideological perspective does not influence the polarity of the territorial–functional dimension. The free-market and liberal-democratic bias inherent to the choice of the media outlet is consistent over the entire period analysed. This consistency enables us to control for the ideological bias and focus on the identification of the shifts between a territorial and functional focus in the global discourse.

Overall, using *The Economist* as a source of data offers advantages that no other source can match. While we recognize and account for the biases inherent in our source, the longitudinal and analytical depth of *The Economist* provides an invaluable resource for tracing the contours of global cleavages through the lens of one of the most enduring and influential media outlets in the world. We do not claim that this method and source are able to capture world inequality but that it is suited to the goal of identifying the structure of global cleavages, that is, the way in which global divisions are politicized. The politicization of inequality in terms of cleavage is captured by an outlet that reports on political oppositions. Given our particular interest in tracking the evolution of cleavages, text analysis proves particularly fitting for a historical examination intending to trace back to the pivotal moments of the National and Industrial Revolutions in the mid-19th century, as it allows a continuous, uninterrupted indicator. As far as we can tell, this is an untapped source of text in comparative politics.


The articles from *The Economist* were downloaded from the Gale Digital Scholar Lab, a digital archive that contains a vast array of primary sources including all issues of *The Economist* from the beginning of its existence in 1843 to 2020.<sup>10</sup> In this archive, articles are tagged and can be selected by their “Section” and/or “Type”. The category “Section” allows users to select from multiple categories of topics: business, sports, news, opinions and editorials, people, preliminary matter, and advertisements. The option “Type” lists various types of material: both substantial material, such as articles, editorials, financial reports, letters, obituaries and reviews, and graphic material, such as front matter, cartoons, tables of content and advertisements.

<sup>10</sup> Articles from *The Economist*'s archive can be legally downloaded, mined and analysed without restriction. The archive's download procedure requires users to access articles in bunches of 5,000 items at a time. See <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/digital-scholar-lab>. The subscription was provided by the University of XXX. Data and code will be provided for internal replication. Coding files will be openly accessible, but due to the Gale Digital Scholar Lab's policy, we are not allowed to make the data publicly available.

Articles with the following categories have been downloaded: “News” and “Opinions and editorials” in the tag “Section”, and “Article” and “Editorial” in the tag “Type”. The rationale is that news articles and opinion leaders provide an interpretation of the world. Excluding items like advertisements, front matter and letters, and focussing on actual articles avoids introducing noise in the data. In addition to the articles’ text, we also downloaded the metadata associated with each item (title, date of publication, content type, publication type, identification number, etc.), which were then matched with the text items. The basic units of analysis are therefore articles. This process produced a dataset of 316,749 textual items read into the open-source software R.<sup>11</sup>

Texts were digitalized using Optical Character Recognition (OCR). The Gale Digital Scholar Lab provides OCR precision scores for every article in its archive. This technique creates some data quality issues, which mainly affect earlier issues of *The Economist*.<sup>12</sup> We used the functions in the Quanteda package (Benoit et al. 2018) to pre-process our data, removing its punctuation, stop words and words with very low or very high frequency.<sup>13</sup> We identified various patterns of errors in the textual data, such as missing letters and duplicates, and corrected them in the pre-processing phase. We dismissed articles with missing metadata and only considered articles longer than 150 words. Shorter articles were removed from the dataset because they typically include graphs or tables that introduce unnecessary noise into the analysis. These cleaning procedures reduced the total number of articles in the final dataset to 308,329. The average length of these articles is 961 words. Figure 2 provides information about the data, specifically how the type of articles has varied over time as well as the average article length. Overall, the number of articles remains fairly stable over time and there is no significant variation in the length of articles.

**Figure 2 Types of articles and average length (1843–2020)**



11 By comparing the metadata files with the downloaded articles, we noticed that approximately 1,600 articles were missing for the year 1962. For another set of around 400 articles between 1903 and 1906, the date of publication was missing. Gale Digital Scholar Lab assisted us in fixing both issues so that these 2,000 items could be included in the dataset. Editorials are tagged incorrectly before 1920 making it impossible to identify them. Since we include all articles (also editorials), this does not affect our analysis.

12 The lowest OCR precision score we encounter is 68 per cent. Precision scores can be affected by scans of old material, font types and presence of images. They are typical for articles from the 19<sup>th</sup> century and from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (see Online Appendices). Scores improve significantly for more recent issues.

13 We excluded words that appear less than 50 times in the text corpus, as well as those that appear more than 250,000 times. Words occurring more than 250,000 times represent 0.0003% of the word distribution in the corpus.



The methodology must be able to measure the territoriality and functionality of global cleavages in media discourse, and trace how the dimension has evolved over time. Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS), a semi-supervised document scaling technique that allows users to locate text documents on user-defined dimensions using a small set of seed words (Watanabe 2021), is the most appropriate method for this purpose. It can be applied to various dimensions and can be used to build a scale – in our case, a scale between territoriality and functionality. LSS relies on word embeddings, a method that turns words into numerical vectors by positioning them in a multi-dimensional space. Within this space, the distances between different words become indicative of their meaning. Words positioned closer to one another are thus identified as carrying a similar meaning, while words that are further apart as carrying a more dissimilar meaning.

The technique relies on seed words. The LSS algorithm uses the cosine distance to the seed words that researchers define to calculate a “polarity score” for each term in the corpus. Document polarity scores are then calculated by aggregating individual word scores and weighting them by their relative frequency within the document. This procedure produces document scores that make it possible to position articles on the scale we defined. We constructed a scale between the extremes of territoriality and functionality. An advantage of this method is that it does not depend on manually coded documents typical of other techniques, such as supervised machine learning. In addition, supervised machine learning techniques rely on algorithms that require intensive human coding to “train” the models. LSS assigns the documents polarity scores on a fixed scale over time, which makes the method suitable for historical analysis using longitudinal data (Watanabe 2021). This feature of the method makes it more suitable for theory-driven analysis than non-supervised machine learning algorithms, which is exploratory-oriented and identifies latent dimensions *ex post*. The models were estimated using the LSA package in R (Watanabe and Zhou 2022).

The choice of  $k$  for the number of dimensions used to reduce the term-document matrix through singular value decomposition (SVD) involves a trade-off – a value too low may lead to loss of important information, while a value too high may retain too much noise along with the relevant semantic information. We adhered to the default parameter of  $k = 300$ . This choice is supported by empirical evidence in the literature (Watanabe 2021), demonstrating that this value effectively balances computational efficiency with the retention of meaningful semantic content. The semi-supervised nature of LSS makes the selection of seed words crucial for the validity of the model insofar as they directly link with the theoretical construct. Seed words should reflect the two poles of territoriality and functionality, and should ideally be characterized by strong polarity and low ambiguity (Watanabe 2021).

The seed words we specified for the main model are presented in Table 1. In the choice of polarity words, we avoided period- or context-specific words, such as colony, Warsaw Pact (non-) aligned, Third World, polar, North, South, East, West, emerging, periphery (for the territorial pole) and aristocracy, bourgeoisie, generation, gay, women, communism, fascism, populism, middle class (for the functional pole). The meaning of the words does not substantially change over time. We also avoided terms that do not apply globally, such as caste, clan or tribe, and terms that may prove ambiguous, such as global, international or people. None of the seed words are too close to the latent dimensions they are trying to capture. Figure 3 illustrates our chosen seed words and their position on the scale from functionality to territoriality (negative to positive polarity scores).


**Table 1 Seed words for the LSS analysis**

<i>Poles</i>	<i>Seed words</i>
Territorial	bloc*, region*, civilisation*, countr*, nation*
Functional	class, ideolog*, inequalit*, group*, social

Note: The asterisk indicates that the analysis considers words with the same root and different endings.

The scale takes values of territoriality through a positive sign and of functionality through a negative sign, with most of the variation limited to the range between +1 and -1. The analysis yields meaningful results and confirms the validity of the method. The words the algorithm associates with the scale align with our theoretical expectations. Appendix Table A1 in Appendix 1 lists the twenty words most frequently associated with each of the two sets of seed words. Together with Appendix Figure A1, this association clearly indicates that our model is valid as the most functional and territorial words reflect the concepts we intend to measure. In addition, we replicated the model by dropping each seed word consecutively. Results from this robustness test are reported in Appendix 2 (Appendix Figure A2). The exercise illustrates that our results remain stable, even if we remove individual words.<sup>14</sup> This is also illustrated by the very high correlation of polarity scores between the original model and the model with omitted seed words, presented in Appendix Table A2. This exercise also points to the fact that the omission of none of the seed words is consequential in our results, nor that a word (such as “inequality”, a rather functional concept) may have a meaning relating to both poles.

**Figure 3 Seed words and polarity scores**



<sup>14</sup> The rotation of words does reveal the stronger effect of two words: “country” and “ideology”. A further robustness test is documented in Online Appendix 3 (Online Appendix Figures 5 and 6) with the addition of the seed word “colony”. The main difference is that also “military” crosses into functional lower half.

Furthermore, it is important to validate the accuracy of the scale and the validity of the model to provide a solid ground for the evidence and to strengthen confidence in this basic finding of our analysis. To evaluate the accuracy of the scale and the validity of the model, we compared the performance of our model to human coding of a subset of the data. We randomly selected 300 articles and compared the model's scores to our own assessment of the articles.<sup>15</sup> The 300 manually coded articles were used to calculate accuracy, precision, and recall, as well as the F1-score, which denotes the harmonic mean between recall and precision (Table 2).<sup>16</sup> These performance metrics are commonly used in machine learning. Accuracy describes the proportion of correctly classified articles (the sum of true positives and negatives divided by the total number of articles). Recall represents the proportion of correctly predicted observations out of all true observations (the number of true positives divided by the sum of true and false positives). This measure therefore indicates the number of articles the algorithm classifies correctly (false negatives). Precision informs of the proportion of correctly predicted observations out of all predicted observations (thereby indicating the number of false positives).

**Table 2 Model performance statistics**

<i>Poles</i>	<i>Accuracy</i>	<i>Recall</i>	<i>Precision</i>	<i>F1-score</i>
Functional	.78	.67	.59	.63
Territorial	.71	.76	.64	.69

The results of the validation test in Table 2 show that our trained LSS model had a good performance – its accuracy was slightly higher than that of comparable analyses in Trubowitz and Watanabe (2021). As these authors point out, discrepancies between human and machine classifications are to be expected, especially with complex categories, such as territoriality and functionality in a historical context. While humans make use of their historical knowledge to classify news articles, machine learning models rely solely on the words that appear in the text. This means that compared to a machine learning model, humans have more information to form their judgements of any given news article. Despite these differences, the F1-score indicates that the model's scores are accurate, which demonstrates that this method is a valid way of measuring cleavages over time.

For the topic-based analysis that we use to test which types of politicization drive the process of globalization, we organized the articles into six distinct categories. These categories encompass cultural, economic, military, political, social, and sports-related topics. To create subsets of articles within these categories, we employed specific dictionaries designed to detect and classify articles according to these topics.<sup>17</sup> The dictionary filters were only applied after running the LSS model on the entire corpus.

<sup>15</sup> See Online Appendix 2 for coder guidelines, including the definitions of territorial and functional frames, as well as examples from the data. Each article received a score between -1 (functional frame) and 1 (territorial frame), while 0 was used to score articles that cover both types of frames to a relatively equal extent and articles that cover neither frame. The manual coding was performed by one of this paper's authors. We adhere to the widely accepted method of using manual coding for validation purposes that is well-established in the literature (Grimmer et al. 2022). The approach is based on the understanding that human judgment provides a reliable benchmark for evaluating the efficacy of algorithms.

<sup>16</sup> The harmonic mean is calculated as follows:  $F1 = 2 \times (\text{recall} \times \text{precision} / (\text{recall} + \text{precision}))$ .

<sup>17</sup> Articles were selected based on the presence of topic-specific keywords appearing at least three times within an article. For the "cultural" category, the keywords included: culture, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, minority, and tolerance (6,122 articles). For "economic" topics, the keywords were: economy, income, inequality, development, resources, trade, GDP, rich, and poor (103,999 articles). The "political" category utilized the following keywords: politic\*, power, government, voting, influence, rights, and freedom (141,948 articles). The "social" category included: social, education, health, mortality, gender, women, literacy, and migration (29,716 articles). For "military" topics, the keywords were: diplomacy, military, weapons, defense, alliance, and war (39,928 articles). Lastly, the "sports" category used the following keywords: sport, ball, score, team, and player (7,140 articles).




## Trends in the Globalization of Politics

### *The Globalization of Politics after World War II*

The main result of the analysis appears in Figure 4. The period between the middle of the 19th century and the present day is marked by a trend of de-territorialization in the framing of global cleavages present in the discourse of *The Economist's* editorials and news articles. The interpolation curve clearly moves from the upper half of the graph, where territoriality is high, to its lower half, where territoriality is replaced by functionality.<sup>18</sup> This supports the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical section that we should expect the discourse on global cleavages to move from a predominantly territorial to a more functional framing over time. Overall, the trend does not reveal major reversals with the territorial frame being displaced by the functional one in a continuous way. The functional frame reaches its peak strength at the beginning of the 21st century and the corresponding levels of territoriality are lower than those observed at any other time during the entire period of 180 years considered by the analysis, even though the past decade (from 2010 onwards) has been characterized by a stabilization, if not a slight reactivation of territoriality.

Beyond this broadly brushed result, more nuanced patterns reveal themselves. The dominance of the functional frame is a feature of the period since the 1970s. This is the decade in which the curve crosses the mid-point in the territorial–functional continuum. From that moment on, the functional frame has been progressively gaining prominence. However, the steep trend away from territoriality towards functionality first starts after World War II. It is from the second post-war period until the present that the de-territorialization of *The Economist's* discourse takes place. In contrast, the period leading up to World War II is characterized by a stable territorial frame, even though the latter's levels are slightly lower than those found in the middle of the 19th century. Territoriality only increases between World War I and World War II, the only reversal in this trend.

**Figure 4 The process of globalization of politics**



<sup>18</sup> The y-axis of the graph represents the mean value the model estimates for all articles within a specific year. Scores close to zero imply that neither territorial nor functional frames prevail, both being covered in the article, or that the article includes neither.

For a comparative reference point, the globalization of politics takes place later than similar processes of de-territorialization of cleavage structures at European level (Schattschneider 1960, Caramani 2004, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Morgenstern 2017) and European level (Caramani 2015). Both nationalization and Europeanization reach their highest levels of de-territorialization in the second half of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century, in conjunction with the processes of state formation and nation-building as well as, most crucially, with the political mobilization and class politics carried out by mass parties during the period of Europe's democratization and extension of the franchise (and the concomitant increase in party competition). The latter brought forward a cross-local left-right ideological dimension that cut across territorial units, be it regions at the national level or nation-states at the European level. The patterns in the globalization of politics displayed in Figure 4 indicate a later development, namely after World War II.

Democratization and mass political mobilization are, until the post-World War II period, processes that take place in the West – Western Europe and North America mainly. From a global perspective, this specificity reinforces the contrast between the West and other world regions, where mass democratization and industrialization took place later. Whatever type of territoriality characterizing the pre-World War II period (core-periphery, North-South, East-West or other), it persists until the post-World War II period. The trend of globalization of politics visualized by Figure 4 suggests that territoriality dissolves in conjunction with the international ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism of the Cold War that permeated processes of de-colonization and modernization beyond the West, and, after the end of the Cold War, in conjunction with global economic integration. This ideological element replaces the territorial one once it diffuses beyond the West. According to our indicator, furthermore, the dominance of this ideological continuum has not been reversed by “civilizational” fault lines. The fact that seed words (Table 1) refer to global (as opposed to domestic) territoriality, indicates that the trend towards functional politicization in Figure 4 captures global cleavages rather than domestic ones.<sup>19</sup>

### ***A More Fine-Grained Analysis of Temporal Patterns***

The strong performance of the model enables us to delve into more detailed observations, exploring the fluctuations in territoriality and functionality levels over time. In particular, the solid curve in Figure 4 displays a number of distinct “peaks” in territoriality. Figure 5 zooms into the more fine-grained movements of the scale and indicates the major historical events associated with spikes in territoriality. The highlighted events have been selected by identifying the articles with the highest territoriality scores published during each period marked by a spike in the territorial framing and qualitatively assessing the subjects of these articles. The spikes in territoriality that the model produces correspond to events for which one would expect territoriality to peak. They constitute an additional validation, and the content of the articles with high territoriality scores further attests to the model's validity.<sup>20</sup>


Most of the spikes produced by volatility come from war-like events, especially conventional wars between nation-states. Conventional wars are typically fought between polities. They are not confrontations that cut across territorial lines. It is therefore in line with the expectations formulated in the theoretical section that the scale moves toward more territoriality during the periods when such events took place. As we see later, the texts from *The Economist* that deal with military topics are the only articles for which there is no de-territorialization over time. This fact further confirms that the model is robust and that discourse around interstate wars is an instance of territorial politicization.

<sup>19</sup> The proportion of articles in *The Economist* that focus on domestic features does not increase over time. One can thus exclude the possibility that the observed growing functionality may result from a higher number of articles on domestic matters with a functionalist frame. See Online Appendix 1 for the number of domestic articles over time (Online Appendix Figures 1–3) and for the robustness test showing that results do not change once we exclude articles with up to three domestic words (Online Appendix Figure 4).

<sup>20</sup> On benchmarking our model against major historical events as a robustness test, see Trubowitz and Watanabe (2021).

Theoretically, we also expect that a territorial discourse prevails during a period nationalist ideology. This is what we observe, as the increase in territoriality between the 1850s and the 1870s shows. The first set of peaks that the model detects is located during a historical period defined by nationalism in Europe but also colonization overseas. Processes of state formation and nation-building in Europe are associated with wars for independence and the ideology of national self-determination. The model accurately captures the territoriality inherent to these liberation movements, especially Italian unification, independence and democratization (the *Risorgimento*). The model picks up this event in particular, even though similar movements, such as the Polish and the Irish strives for self-determination, took place at the same time and with Belgium's independence and Greece's liberation from the Ottoman Empire. Zooming into the data and reading the articles with the most territorial framing confirms such events. However, the model also identifies the Crimean war from 1853 onwards and episodes concerning China and India among others, with *The Economist's* discourse stressing the colonial nature of global relations, economies' geographic specialization and Europe's political dominance.

**Figure 5 Comparing the model estimates against historical events**



That wars between states lead to stronger territoriality in the frames of texts is further confirmed by the spikes around and between World War I and World War II. The spikes reflect the strongly territorial discourse surrounding wars between nations in Europe and beyond. On the one hand, these patterns largely account for the maintenance of stable territoriality in the inter-wars period that we mentioned in the discussion of the general results. On the other hand, the absence of such conflicts in the second half of the 20th century accounts for the inflection point after World War II – from then on, the functional discourse rises decidedly. In addition to the absence of inter-state confrontations, the ideological framing of the confrontation likely contributes to the decline of territoriality in *The Economist's* texts. Both the Cold War and its manifestations in inter-state wars, such as the Vietnam War, appear to be predominantly portrayed as ideological confrontations between liberal democracy and market economy on the one hand, and communist planned economy on the other. This factor in the interpretation of the functional trend after World War II is reinforced by de-colonization, hinting at the ideological confrontation through the Marxist leadership in the struggle for independence. This is not the case with the 1990 Gulf War, which the articles present through a more territorial frame.

Given the importance of wars in IR theory, particular attention must be given to their changing nature after World War II (from international to intrastate and unconventional wars involving non-state actors), to avoid the risk of our measure being driven by this change. As discussed in the next subsection, when selecting articles that do not involve war, military alliances and diplomatic relations the pattern toward more functional divisions remains.

In contrast to the straightforward way in which the model is able to detect events responsible for increases in the levels of territoriality, no single event drives the functional politicization that we observe in the period since World War II. In line with our theoretical expectations, the examination of the articles that the model scores as the most functional, suggests that texts for this period provide discussions on a variety of topics related to broad processes of economic globalization, geographic mobility, the rise of inequality between social classes, ideological transformations and the role of political parties, among others. This type of discourse is linked to macro socio-economic, political and cultural changes. While territoriality appears to be linked to specific events, functionality appears to take the more continuous shape of abstract – not directly observable – processes of social, cultural, political and economic transformation.

### ***Trends in the Globalization of Politics by Topic***

To explore the distinction between territorial and functional types of politicization more systematically, we break the pattern we observe down into different topics. As outlined in the theoretical section, we expect politicization around nationalism and state interests to produce high territoriality, whereas politicization around social and economic rights to transcend borders and produce functional cleavages that are more globalized. The politicization of some inequalities can be expected to be more or less susceptible to maintaining a high territoriality when they become politicized into cleavages. Accordingly, one should expect the model to reveal different trends in de-territorialization depending on each topic. Topics on oppositions about the unequal distribution of certain resources may be associated with lower territoriality (say, civil rights for homosexuals) than topics on oppositions about other resources (say, voting power in the United Nation General Assembly). Some articles connected to a given overarching topic may show persisting territorial divisions over time because the nature of the topic itself presupposes a territorial framing rather than a functional one. In contrast, articles on other topics may yield results similar to the results of the original model, which uses all articles. We expect that applying the original model to different subsets of articles would not always result in the same general trend of subsiding territoriality.

We probe our model on subsets of articles on specific topics by means of context words (Figure 6).<sup>21</sup> The purpose of the topic analysis is to show that the observed overarching trend, i.e. the transformation of global divisions from territorial to functional dynamics spanning nearly two centuries, is driven by articles on the politicization of specific resources and rights as discussed theoretically. Based on the distinction between rights that are more or less unequally distributed and politicized into cleavages, the analysis has been broken down into topics based on the theoretical section. Social and cultural topics have been further separated, as the former refer to the civil rights of gender and minorities, literacy and other development topics, such as health, while the latter encompass identity matters that relate to sexuality, language, ethnicity and religion. The subgroups of articles on our chosen topics were created using dictionaries as described in the methods section above.

The subgroup on sports is used as a “check”, as one would expect it to simply reproduce the general pattern identified by our main analysis. This serves as another robustness check of our model’s accuracy and validity. For this “control” topic the model behaves as expected, namely following the general trend set by the reports’ global focus, which highlights the ideals of the world “coming together” and geographic barriers being abolished and stresses the transcendence of functional

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<sup>21</sup> The Gale Digital Scholar Lab allows users to filter articles by type but this feature, did not prove very useful to the questions addressed in this paper, nor did structural topic modelling (Roberts et al. 2019).

divisions in human rights and anti-racism campaigns, as well as women's and transgender citizens' participation on a fair footing.

Which frame prevails across the other topics? Most graphs reflect the overall trend of global cleavages becoming less territorial. With the exception of the graph for the military (a finding supported by the spikes in territoriality around inter-state wars seen above), all curves move from the upper to the lower halves of the graphs. However, there is a noticeable variation across topics.

First, trends in the levels of territoriality are similar to the overall picture in Figure 4 for the economy and culture, whereas for politics the levels of territoriality are higher until World War II. Social topics (which include articles on education, health, gender and migration) stand out as they reflect more functionality than any other topic. The levels of territoriality are low from the outset and drop to a much lower level than other topics in the second half of the 20th century. For the military topic, the model produces results that show a territorial politicization dominating throughout the period as expected. Military topics stand out both for reaching the highest levels of territoriality and their stability over time. The pattern of articles focussing on wars and alliances dispels the risk that the general pattern in Figure 4 reflects the declining importance of international wars and the increase of unconventional wars by non-state actors. On the one hand, in all other topics in which articles on the military are excluded the pattern toward functionality holds. Therefore, the graphs cannot be driven by the changing nature of wars. On the other hand, military topics are the ones for which the line does not drop and does not cross into the functional lower half of the graph. Were the changing nature of wars driving de-territorialization, we would first and foremost see this in the military panel.


Second, timing varies across topics. In terms of "inflection point", for military topics there is no inflection point as the former remains stable and the latter displays a continuous declining trend of territoriality. For the economy and politics topics, the inflection point is around the 1940s (similarly, the inflection point for culture is around the 1930s). Again, social topics stand out with their earlier inflection point during the 1910s. Accordingly, the "cross-over" from the territorial to the functional half of the graphs occurs earlier in the coverage of social topics (around the 1920s) than in the coverage of economic events, politics and culture (around the 1960s).

Third, the volatility of the curves differs according to topics. This variation relates to the number of articles: when there are many articles on a particular topic, volatility is low. Based on this, the curves do not display high spikes of territoriality or functionality for the topics of economy and politics. The military and social topics are marked by mid-range volatility, but the trends and levels in both cases are so clearly delineated that volatility does not make their interpretation problematic, especially after World War II when volatility decreased for both. In contrast, the coverage of cultural topics is marked by high volatility (again, less so after World War II) that blurs the overall trend of stable levels of territoriality until World War II. There are spikes of both strong functionality and territoriality. The presence of spikes indicates that they are driven by a few articles (that weigh heavily in a smaller corpus of texts) on topics, such as culture, religion and ethnicity, as groups within countries or transnationally, but also in their unequal distribution across countries and world regions.

The military and social contexts display the highest and lowest levels of territoriality, respectively. Global cleavages in these areas represent the two extremes on the territorial–functional continuum. As seen in the theoretical section, discourse about military affairs is territorial almost by definition, as it relates to inter-state confrontations and alliances. While there can be a class-based discourse on the military personnel and spending for example, it is mostly territorial. Discussions about international politics, with their emphasis on diplomatic clue, cultural hegemony, economic dominance – "realist" power – share these characteristics with the military topic. However, this changes quite radically over time, in contrast to discourse about the military.



Figure 6 The decline of territoriality by topic



The graph for social topics clearly shows that the cleavages in this domain have always been weakly territorialized. The curve comes close to “zero” from the outset. It is true that inequalities in health and literacy vary dramatically across world regions. However, it seems that they are framed as class inequalities first and foremost. In addition, the topic also encompasses typical group inequalities that have little to do with location, such as gender equality and differences between generations, as well as diffusion factors, such as migration. The number of articles per topic affects the aggregation of these results as done in Figures 4 and 5. The topics of politics and economy dominate and display similar trends toward functionality. This reflects their growing relevance and the mirroring decline of topics, such as the military, especially after the end of the Cold War, but also before its end. Summing up, dissecting the corpus into different themes confirms that the transition to functional cleavages is driven by social and economic topics. De-territorialization is not driven by the established IR factors relating to the declining importance of international wars.

## **Conclusion: De-Territorialization and Global Governance**

The broad scale findings presented in this paper show that global inequalities are increasingly politicized, as functional cleavages that cut across global territoriality progressively replace territorial cleavages opposing world regions. This result is based on empirical measures of the discourse on global affairs published in *The Economist's* articles between 1843 and 2020, a continuous, analytical and so far untapped source of text on global affairs. De-territorialization is mainly a phenomenon of the second half of the 20th century, whereas the roughly hundred years from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century maintain a rather stable level of territoriality. The timing of the globalization of politics points to the salience of social and economic inequalities, and their politicization through left–right ideologies, which apply globally and create both convergence between world regions and linkage between groups with similar grievances across borders. These functional oppositions replace highly territorial confrontations politicized by nationalist, religious and “civilizational” ideologies.

The pattern from territorial to functional goes against the view about spatial tensions that the salience of cross-country differences in structuring conflict increases with higher levels of aggregation. This is a core theoretical contribution that results from the extension of cleavage theory from the national and European levels to the global level. The novelty of this paper is that it does not limit the cleavage approach to the domestic level but instead applies it to the global level. The cleavage perspective based on different types of politicization differs from approaches that simply map inequalities in sociological and economic analysis. It also extends such politicization to inequalities other than economic ones, to include social, cultural and political unequal distributions of resources. The paper thus introduces a political perspective and a cleavage approach to global inequality by considering the politicization measured in the framing by an encompassing sources of text over 180 years.

The normative implications of evidence attesting to cross-territorial world-wide cleavages are far reaching. While our territory–function scale does not measure patterns of differentiated economic and political integration in different regions, by measuring the territoriality and de-territorialization of cleavages our approach helps nonetheless illuminate processes of political integration insofar as we highlight the conditions that are conducive to integration. Integrated systems of governance are supported by shared alignments common to the different territorial units they are composed of. Such alignments enhance representation, in particular the “virtual representation” (Pitkin 1967) of a communion of interests across localities. This does not mean absence of conflict but, rather, conflict lines that do not pitch territories against one another. The role of this cross-cuttingness has been recognized at the national and European arenas. This paper extends it to the global arenas and considers their implications for a setup of global democratic institutions premised upon ideologies (Tallberg et al. 2014, Voeten 2021). What this approach allows, therefore, is to conceptualize global integration in politicized – rather than de-politicized and technocratic – terms.

The innovative method and data we employ allow us to measure these processes with a new territory–function scale derived through LSS, an established method to capture latent dimensions which is particularly suitable for historical analysis. Moreover, while our primary aim is to analyse specific trends and patterns within the globalization of politics, we also recognize the broader applicability of our findings. The methodologies and analytical frameworks we employ, although specific to our research, hold relevance for a wider scholarly audience. Researchers delving into the globalization of politics from a historical perspective or exploring similar comprehensive subjects might find the results and models developed in this paper useful for their own studies. This approach enhances the paper’s contribution, providing a valuable resource for further academic inquiry and interdisciplinary dialogue.

In this sense, the evidence presented in this paper is the starting point of a broader analysis. In particular, future research needs to extend to actors’ discourse to capture the different ideologies that politicize global inequalities. These should include transnational parties, international organizations, or global social movements among others (Thérien 1999, Noël and Thérien 2008). In addition, territoriality itself deserves more research. The inter-disciplinary literature on global territoriality suggests a sequence of territorial patterns throughout historical periods that can be measured by building new dimensions: core–periphery and colonial (North–South) structures, East–West and Cold War divisions during de-colonization, supported by a transnational ideological opposition that corresponds to the phases of clearest de-territorialization, civilizational and value-based world regionalism. Furthermore, the temporal pattern of “globalization of politics” itself varies over time. The conditions at the origin of such variation therefore require further analysis. Economic and cultural globalization have taken place during the period since World War II. Various indices based on data for trade, diplomatic connections and communication, cultural exchanges and geographical mobility point to these patterns in globalization.<sup>22</sup> The media discourse on global cleavages as increasingly framed in functional terms, together with the politicization of global cleavages as class inequalities rather than regional ones, thus seems to reflect a trend toward global integration. Future analysis should link more closely the long-term trend of the globalization of cleavages with economic, political and cultural globalization.

Finally, future reversals will need investigation. Current developments such as the opposition between East and West that stems from the economic and military rise of China and, most dramatically, from the war in Ukraine, may reverse patterns of de-territorialization. The fact that we did not find evidence of a civilizational re-territorialization taking place since the late 20th century does not exclude the possibility of future re-territorialization. The conditions for global actors’ coordination and global governance systems are changeable, as the current turbulence in international affairs demonstrates. This is possible even if our analysis shows that spikes of territoriality due to geo-political turbulences did not, in the past, reverse the long-term trend toward functionality.

Ultimately, our paper demonstrates that views of the world have changed over the past half century. To use a geological analogy, the discourse on global cleavages has moved away from seeing the world as fragmented into distinct world regions, divided by “fault lines” that separate them like tectonic plates, towards seeing it as more homogeneous, where levels of wealth and opportunity, access to cultural resources, the legitimacy of voice and the enjoyment of a range of rights are stratified from top to bottom in a similar way across the globe – like layers of sedimentation. Such a process replicates in the global arena what has been observed at the national and European levels. Nationalization (Schattschneider 1960, Caramani 2004, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Morgenstern 2017) and Europeanization (Caramani 2015) have taken place “earlier”, but similarly in conjunction with the closure of membership and territorial boundaries reducing exit options and internalizing voice. De-territorialization is a feature of cleavage structures in integrating systems. This applies to the global level beyond the national and regional levels. The analytical framework developed in

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<sup>22</sup> See the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database: Openness ([http://www.uc3m.es/tradehist\\_db](http://www.uc3m.es/tradehist_db)) and the KOF Globalization Index from ETH Zurich (<http://kof.ethz.ch>).



this paper therefore serves also the goal of bridging comparative politics and IR and of linking the different levels into a common theoretical construct based on cleavage theory.

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
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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Polarity scores and word frequencies

**Appendix Figure A1 Distribution of polarity scores**




**Appendix Table A1 Twenty most frequent words associated with the sets of seed words**

<i>Territorial</i>	<i>Functional</i>
civilisation	unearned
abyssinia	after-tax
blockade	one-parent
sovereignty	psc
european	breadwinner
diplomacy	disparities
frontiers	median
eastward	income
balkans	non-cash
navies	earners
powers	childless
annexation	percentile
territory	meanstested
civilisation.o	rowntree
conquest	egalitarian
protectorate	decile
warlike	means-tested
territories	quintile
atlantic	inequality
civilising	inequalities

## Appendix 2 Robustness check with rotation of seed words

### Appendix Figure A2 Main model plots with one-at-a-time omission of seed words




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


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
Seed words for “territory”  
Omission of “nation\*”




Seed words for “function”  
Omission of “inequalit\*”



Omission of “region\*”



Omission of “social”



Note: The asterisk indicates that the analysis considers words with the same root and different endings.

**Appendix Table A2 Correlations of document polarity scores between original model and models with one word omitted**

<i>Omitted word</i>	<i>Pearson's correlation</i>
bloc	0.97
civilization	0.83
class	0.96
countr	0.96
group	0.98
ideolog	0.82
inequalit	0.91
nation	0.99
region	0.95
social	0.99
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.93</i>




## Online Appendices


### Online Appendix 1 Number of domestic articles

Articles selected based on following keywords: United Kingdom, UK, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, Great Britain.


**Online Appendix Figure 1 Annual average of occurrences of words per article**




**Online Appendix Figure 2 Proportion of articles with at least one domestic word present**



**Online Appendix Figure 3 Proportion of articles with at least three domestic words present**



**Online Appendix Figure 4 Robustness test: results excluding articles with domestic words**



## Online Appendix 2 Validation test: definitions and examples

The validation test of the automated text analysis was performed by a human coder on 300 randomly selected articles. Each of these articles was classified as either territorial or functional (“1” or “-1”, with the possibility of giving “0” or “NA”) depending on whether the article is *framed* in territorial or functional terms. Below are the definitions of our concepts of interest that guided the coding of the articles.

- *Territorial cleavages*: Articles are framed in territorial terms if their main themes cover topics about *territorially* defined actors and issues. Examples for articles with territorial framing are such that cover topics about nations/nation-states, national interests, conflicts between states, regions, civilizations, blocs of countries. Articles with territorial cleavage framing score “1”.
- *Functional cleavages*: Articles are framed in functional terms if their main themes cover topics about *non-territorially* defined social groups and issues. For instance, articles about inequality between societal groups (e.g., economic inequality) have a functional cleavage framing. Other examples are articles about social classes and groups (e.g., working class, middle class etc.), political ideologies, political parties, cross-territorial issues (e.g., values and attitudes that are not exclusive to a single nation-state/region). What delineates these articles is that the main actors and the topics they cover are *not* defined by territory. Articles with functional cleavage framing score “-1”.
- Articles score “NA” in cases where the text is not legible, and its meaning is impossible to understand.
- Articles score “0” when they: (1) equally cover both types of frames and it is impossible to say which framing prevails (functional and territorial cleavage framing); (2) cover neither of the two categories of frames.

The following articles are examples for each of the coding categories. Note that the texts are presented as they appear in the Digital Scholar Lab archive and in our dataset respectively.

### 1. Territorial cleavages framing (score 1).

TURKEY AND-RUSSIA. THE VIENNA PnOTOCOi.. signed on December 5. at Vienna. by the representatives of the four great Powers- The undersigned. representatives of Austria. France. Great Britain. and Prussia. in conformity with the instructions of their Courts. have assembled at a conference for the purpose of seeking out means of arranging the difference which has arisen between the Court of Russian and the Sublime Porte. The proportions which that difference has assumed. and the war which has burst out between the two Empires. in spite of the efforts of their allies. have become for all Europe the object of most serious preoccupations in consequence. the Emperor of Austria. the Emperor of the French. the Queen of Great Britain. and the King of Prussia. equally penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to these hostilities. which cannot be prolonged without affecting the interests of their own States. have resolved to offer their good offices to the two belligerent parties. in the hope that they would not themselves incur the responsibility of a conflagration when. by an exchange of loyal explanations. they may still prevent it. again placing their relations on the footing of peace and of a good understanding. The assurances given on several occasions by the Emperor of Russia exclude the idea that that august sovereign entertains any wish to interfere with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The existence of Turkey. in the limit which treaties have assigned to her. has in fact become one of the necessary conditions of the European equilibrium. and the undersigned plenipotentiaries declare with satisfaction that the present war cannot. in any case. involve modifications in the territorial circumscriptions of the two Empires. calculated to alter the state of possession which time has consecrated in the East. and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other Powers. The Emperor of Russia. besides. has not confined himself to such assurances. but has declared that his intention had

never been to impose on the Porte new obligations, or any that were not exactly in conformity with the treaties of Kutchuck-Eainordji and Adrianople, according to which the Sublime Porte has promised to protect in the whole extent of its States the Christian religion and its Churches. The Court of Russia has added, that in demanding from the Ottoman Government a testimony of its fidelity to its anterior engagements, it had in no respect intended to attenuate the authority of the Sultan over its Christian subjects, and that its only object was to obtain explanations of a nature to prevent every motive of doubt and every reason for misunderstanding with a friendly and neighbouring Power. The sentiments manifested by the Sublime Porte during the last negotiations prove, on the other hand, that that Power was ready to recognise all its contracted obligations and to pay full attention, in the measure of its sovereign rights, to an interest entertained by the Emperor of Russia for a religion which is his own and that of the majority of his people. In that state of things, the undersigned are convinced that the surest and most ready means of attaining the object desired by their Courts, is to make a communication in common to the Sublime Porte, to explain to it the wish of the Powers to contribute by their friendly intervention to the re-establishment of peace, and to give it an opportunity of stating the conditions on which it would be disposed to treat. Such is the object of the collective note adjoined, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sultan, and of the identical instructions transmitted at the same time by the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia, to their representatives at Constantinople. Of the note or d'Harclli thus referred to and sent to the Ambassadors of the four Powers, at Constantinople, the following is the principal passage. The Governments of the four Powers would be glad should the Sublime Porte declare in the first place that Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia have not too much presumed on its conciliatory intentions in believing it to be still animated with the desire to terminate on favourable conditions the difference which has arisen between it and Russia, and still ready to come to an understanding for this purpose with the other Powers. That, recognising the assurance which Russia has on several occasions given, that it demands no new concessions nor rights infringing upon the sovereignty of the Sultan, the Divan is ready to renew its offer and to discuss the form in which peace shall be re-established, subject to the condition of not being called to accede to any of the demands which have been already refused, and to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the Principalities. This discussion would naturally take place between an Ottoman and Russian negotiator, each furnished with plenipotentiary powers but in order to facilitate the agreement of the two parties, the plenipotentiaries so designated would not treat apart, but in presence of representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia. We can understand the reasons which doubtless would not permit the Sublime Porte to negotiate with Russia in a part of its territory, occupied by the arms of this power. Russia, on its side, would have objections to negotiate in any town of Turkey. It would be proper then to leave the two parties to make choice of a neutral territory, and we abstain therefore from designating any particular place. The object which the four courts propose would not be completely obtained if the opening of the preliminary negotiations of peace were not at the same time the signal for the cessation of hostilities; but we believe that the Sublime Porte will have no good reason to oppose the conclusion of an armistice the conditions of which might be afterwards debated, if it obtained from us the assurance that the terms in which it should declare itself disposed to treat would be equally accepted by Russia. It is in any case a demand which it might address to us and on the hypothesis that the terms proposed by the Ottoman Government should not be such as Russia should at first consent to, we would yet advise the sending of a Turkish plenipotentiary, and the appointment of a town where the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Turkey might meet the representatives of the four courts.

Our Duty to Interfere It is anything but pleasant to be forever travelling over old ground, answering old objections, and exposing old misrepresentations; but when speakers persist in reiterating exploded fallacies, writers are perforce compelled to reiterate previous refutations.... Both Lord Grey and Mr Cobden are of opinion that we have been quite wrong in interfering in the Turkish quarrel at all. Both speakers admit that the conduct of Russia has been unjust, aggressive and indefensible; yet both agree that we should not have interfered to thwart that conduct. Russia has been very wicked, they say; but nevertheless we ought to have allowed Russia to have her way. A

great violation of the law of nations has been ventured on- but what concern was that of ours- A great wrong has been done- but our duty was to stand by and see it done.... But has Mr Cobden read history or travels to so little purpose as not to know that a claim to -protection -is one of the regular steps in the progress of Russian ambition towards the absorption of the States whose territories she desires to append to her already colossal Empire- And has he in his heart the smallest doubt that the demands of Prince Menschikoff. out of which the quarrel has arisen. were. however they may have been worded. but one stride further towards the possession of Constantinople- Did not the seizure of the Principalities show them to be so- Finally. have not Russian avowed despatches. Russian intercepted despatches. Russian acts. made all this as clear as daylight- We say. therefore. without fear of con- futation. that the real question now at issue is whether Russia shall be allowed to appropriate European Turkey and establish her throne at Constantinople-whether she shall be allowed to thwart and repress the internal im- provements and for ever to disturb the internal tranquillity of those countries whose greatest misfortune is their con- tiguity to her-o -whether she shall be allowed to obstruct and destroy the navigation of the Danube. and to make a mare-clausum of the Black Sea- The Economist February 25. 1854

## 2. Functional cleavage framing (score -1)

Incomes Low. lower. lowest If the poor are always with us. in Britain it is because we want them to be. So. by implication. says the sixth report of the royal commission on the distribution of income and wealth. True. economic growth has led to a substantial increase in the purchasing power of those house- holds with the lowest incomes. But it has not led to redistribution in their favour. Since the 1960s the average income with- in the bottom quarter has been less than half the national average. About 60percent of low-income households rely almost entirely on state benefits. and the incomes of earners are also supple- mented. As social security-benefits have been increasingly linked to earnings or prices the relationship of the lowest to average incomes is likely to persist. Should it Underpinning the gap has been the theory that those who could should be encouraged to earn themselves out of poverty. But. in relation to families at least. the commission's report and its background papert suggest the theory is nuts. When the individuals in different kinds of households are added together it turns out that 60percent of those living on the lowest Hard up in Britain Household types as a % of all households 1976 total :20m Households with children Elderly Single adults Single parent households Two adults or more Household types as a % of lowest quarter of incomes 1076 total: 5m 9% 5% incomes (the bottom quarter or below 140percent of supplementary benefit levels) are in families with children. Altogether 8percent of children are living at or around the poverty level. And. although poverty is related to family size. the small number of large families means it is concentrated in families with three or fewer children. There are wage earners in most low- income families. Clearly they need no stick to get them to work. Nor can it be hoped that all they have to do is pull themselves up by their bootlaces to high- er wages. Only a fifth of workers in the bottom 10percent of incomes are in the bottom 10percent of hourly earnings. So increasing pay levels-even to the extent of intro- ducing a minimum wage-would not help most of them. On the other hand women. who de- spite equal-pay legislation earn the lowest hourly rates. do not necessarily live in poverty. Instead. their meagre earnings help lift their families out of the slough. Even when a husband has very low earn- ings only 18percent of families have incomes in the lowest quarter if the wife works. compared with 76percent if she does not. So it looks as though the only way of helping families out of poverty is by raising family allowances even higher or (Mr Callaghan has already thought of this) by helping more women into the labour market to work. That still leaves the poorest households Royal commission on the distribution of incomes and wealth. Report No.-6. Lower Incomes. Cmnd 7175. HMSO. 6.75. t Background paper No.-5. The causes of poverty. by R. Layard. D. Piachaud. M. Stewart. HMSO. 3.25. that are completely reliant on social secu- rity. Half of all elderly people have no other income than their basic pension. Only those few who still work. have occupational pensions or own their own homes are likely to have incomes above the lowest quarter. Of those below retir- ing age who are disabled. 32percent of single men. 68percent of single women and 12percent of married women live in poverty. There is



also some evidence that families with a disabled child are forced into poverty because the mother cannot go out to work. And over half the women going it alone with young families are hard up. There is no question of an incentive to work helping any of these cases. It is merely, as a minority addendum suggests, a question of political will. Unemployment is trickier. It tends to hit the low-wage earners, which makes it hard to help them without increasing income support to those in work as well. Unlike most royal commissions this one does not come up with policy recommendations. Nor does it even claim to explain fully why some individuals have low incomes. Only the blind could fail to see the arrows.

3. Neither territorial nor a functional frame (score 0)


COMMERCIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS NEWS. The total number of passengers conveyed on railway in the United Kingdom for the year 1870 was 224,012,194 of whom 74,153,113 were third-class, 153,113 second class, and 31,838,091 first-class. The number of season-ticket holders was 156,403, of whom 118,110 were on lines in England and Wales, 23,462 on lines in Scotland, and 14,831 on lines in Ireland. Of the 31,839,091 first-class passengers on railways in the United Kingdom, 27,004,380 were conveyed on lines in England and Wales, 3,124,300 on lines in Scotland, and 1,710,355 on lines in Ireland. Of the 74,153,113 second-class passengers on railways in the United Kingdom, 68,731,823 were conveyed on lines in England and Wales, 3,372,283 on lines in Scotland, and 4,044,052 on lines in Ireland. Of the 224,012,194 third-class passengers conveyed on lines in the United Kingdom, 194,891,712 were conveyed on lines in England and Wales, 20,050,270 on lines in Scotland, and 8,570,206 on lines in Ireland.

4. Article is not legible (score NA)


LIVERPOOL MARKETS— Wednesday. The Stigmatitic Bill, coming into operation on Saturday last, has caused considerable disturbance at the Customhouse; the rate of exchange having fallen to 110 for 100. DRYWOODS.—The price of turpentine has risen to 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of herring is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of cod is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of salmon is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of mackerel is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of haddock is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of whiting is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of plaice is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of sole is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of turbot is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of salmon trout is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of sea trout is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of eel is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of carp is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of perch is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of roach is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of bream is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of tench is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of minnow is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of dace is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of goby is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of loach is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of nase is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of stone loach is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of minnow is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of dace is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of goby is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of loach is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of nase is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further. The price of stone loach is 11s 6d per cwt, and is expected to rise further.

Online Appendix 3 Validation test: addition of seed word "colony"

Online Appendix Figure 5 Main trend with word "colony" added



Online Appendix Figure 6 Results by topic with word “colony” added





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