Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Hefti, Andreas | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Liu, Shuo | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-25T11:11:07Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-02-25T11:11:07Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1756-2171 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/124916/ | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/21871 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools. | de_CH |
| dc.language.iso | en | de_CH |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | de_CH |
| dc.relation.ispartof | The RAND Journal of Economics | de_CH |
| dc.rights | Licence according to publishing contract | de_CH |
| dc.subject.ddc | 659: Werbung und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | de_CH |
| dc.title | Targeted information and limited attention | de_CH |
| dc.type | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift | de_CH |
| dcterms.type | Text | de_CH |
| zhaw.departement | School of Management and Law | de_CH |
| zhaw.organisationalunit | Zentrum für Arbeitsmärkte, Digitalisierung und Regionalökonomie (CLDR) | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1756-2171.12319 | de_CH |
| zhaw.funding.eu | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.issue | 2 | de_CH |
| zhaw.originated.zhaw | Yes | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.end | 420 | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.start | 402 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.status | publishedVersion | de_CH |
| zhaw.volume | 51 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.review | Peer review (Publikation) | de_CH |
| zhaw.webfeed | W: Spitzenpublikation | de_CH |
| zhaw.author.additional | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.display.portrait | Yes | de_CH |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law | |
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Hefti, A., & Liu, S. (2020). Targeted information and limited attention. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 402–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319
Hefti, A. and Liu, S. (2020) ‘Targeted information and limited attention’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), pp. 402–420. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.
A. Hefti and S. Liu, “Targeted information and limited attention,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 402–420, 2020, doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12319.
HEFTI, Andreas und Shuo LIU, 2020. Targeted information and limited attention. The RAND Journal of Economics [online]. 2020. Bd. 51, Nr. 2, S. 402–420. DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12319. Verfügbar unter: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/124916/
Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. 2020. “Targeted Information and Limited Attention.” The RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2): 402–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.
Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. “Targeted Information and Limited Attention.” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 2, 2020, pp. 402–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.
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