Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979
Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications
Authors: Hefti, Andreas
DOI: 10.21256/zhaw-3979
10.3982/TE2151
Published in: Theoretical Economics
Volume(Issue): 12
Issue: 3
Page(s): 979
Pages to: 1002
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Econometric Society
ISSN: 1933-6837
1555-7561
Language: English
Subjects: Oligopopy; Symmetric equilibrium; Symmetric game; Uniqueness
Subject (DDC): 330: Economics
510: Mathematics
Abstract: This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the strategies. The approach is particularly helpful in applications because (i) it allows the complexity of the uniqueness problem to be reduced to a two-player game, (ii) boundary conditions are less critical compared to standard procedures, and (iii) best replies need not be everywhere differentiable. The usefulness of the separation approach is illustrated with several examples, including an application to asymmetric games and to a two-dimensional price-information game.
URI: https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/10361
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): CC BY-NC 4.0: Attribution - Non commercial 4.0 International
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Center for Economic Policy (FWP)
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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