Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFelder, Stefan-
dc.contributor.authorSchleiniger, Reto-
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-22T14:35:01Z-
dc.date.available2018-11-22T14:35:01Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.issn0921-8009de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1873-6106de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/13131-
dc.description.abstractAlthough market-based environmental measures like uniform CO2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost, they do not prevail in real world policies. An efficiency oriented environmental policy fails, as it involves a redistribution of pollution rights, resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents. The present paper analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility of several CO2 tax and reimbursement schemes, using a computable general equilibrium model of Switzerland. The simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform CO2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofEcological Economicsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectComputable general equilibrium modelde_CH
dc.subjectPolitical feasabilityde_CH
dc.subjectCost efficiencyde_CH
dc.subjectEnvironmental tax reformde_CH
dc.subject.ddc330: Wirtschaftde_CH
dc.subject.ddc333.7: Landflächen, Naturerholungsgebietede_CH
dc.titleEnvironmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibilityde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Energie und Umwelt (CEE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-Xde_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1-2de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawNode_CH
zhaw.pages.end116de_CH
zhaw.pages.start107de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume42de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Show simple item record
Felder, S., & Schleiniger, R. (2002). Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility. Ecological Economics, 42(1-2), 107–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X
Felder, S. and Schleiniger, R. (2002) ‘Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility’, Ecological Economics, 42(1-2), pp. 107–116. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X.
S. Felder and R. Schleiniger, “Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility,” Ecological Economics, vol. 42, no. 1-2, pp. 107–116, 2002, doi: 10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X.
FELDER, Stefan und Reto SCHLEINIGER, 2002. Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility. Ecological Economics. 2002. Bd. 42, Nr. 1-2, S. 107–116. DOI 10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X
Felder, Stefan, and Reto Schleiniger. 2002. “Environmental Tax Reform : Efficiency and Political Feasibility.” Ecological Economics 42 (1-2): 107–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X.
Felder, Stefan, and Reto Schleiniger. “Environmental Tax Reform : Efficiency and Political Feasibility.” Ecological Economics, vol. 42, no. 1-2, 2002, pp. 107–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00109-X.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.