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dc.contributor.authorKuenzel, Karoline-
dc.contributor.authorLoock, Moritz-
dc.contributor.authorCometta, Claudio-
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-29T08:17:28Z-
dc.date.available2019-03-29T08:17:28Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.issn0065-0668de_CH
dc.identifier.issn2151-6561de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16418-
dc.description.abstractFollowing national and international policy guidelines for energy efficiency and in order to optimize supply and demand, electric utilities introduce demand response programs (DR). However firms struggle how to best help consumers to accept these programs. In the light of recent theories of decision-making that favour heuristic over information-based decision strategies, the paper at hand investigates the role of punishment and reward for consumer acceptance of DR. We find that although electric utilities design DR programs mostly based on rewards (assumingly in fear of consumer loyalty), DR regimes based on punishment appear more effective, without jeopardizing loyalty of consumers. Thus, in the light of prospect theory our data indicates that if firms help customers to avoid a loss in form of a punishment this has a larger positive impact on the intended behaviour than if firms help customers to gain a reward. Implications for practice and especially a demand-based view on environmental management apply.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherAcademy of Managementde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofAcademy of Management Proceedingsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc333.79: Energiede_CH
dc.titleHow punishment and reward increase customer acceptance of demand response in the energy industryde_CH
dc.typeKonferenz: Sonstigesde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitInstitut für Innovation und Entrepreneurship (IIE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstractde_CH
zhaw.conference.details74th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Philadelphia, USA, 1-5 August 2014de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume2014de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewNot specifiedde_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Kuenzel, K., Loock, M., & Cometta, C. (2014). How punishment and reward increase customer acceptance of demand response in the energy industry [Conference presentation]. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014(1). https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstract
Kuenzel, K., Loock, M. and Cometta, C. (2014) ‘How punishment and reward increase customer acceptance of demand response in the energy industry’, in Academy of Management Proceedings. Academy of Management. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstract.
K. Kuenzel, M. Loock, and C. Cometta, “How punishment and reward increase customer acceptance of demand response in the energy industry,” in Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014, vol. 2014, no. 1. doi: 10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstract.
KUENZEL, Karoline, Moritz LOOCK und Claudio COMETTA, 2014. How punishment and reward increase customer acceptance of demand response in the energy industry. In: Academy of Management Proceedings. Conference presentation. Academy of Management. 2014
Kuenzel, Karoline, Moritz Loock, and Claudio Cometta. 2014. “How Punishment and Reward Increase Customer Acceptance of Demand Response in the Energy Industry.” Conference presentation. In Academy of Management Proceedings. Vol. 2014. Academy of Management. https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstract.
Kuenzel, Karoline, et al. “How Punishment and Reward Increase Customer Acceptance of Demand Response in the Energy Industry.” Academy of Management Proceedings, vol. 2014, no. 1, Academy of Management, 2014, https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2014.15790abstract.


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