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dc.contributor.authorHefti, Andreas-
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-02T13:58:50Z-
dc.date.available2019-05-02T13:58:50Z-
dc.date.issued2018-11-
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16975-
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a tractable framework that embeds the allocation of limited attention into competition theory. Motivated by evidence from psychology and marketing a setting is studied where firms can manipulate consumer attention and compete in prices among perceived alternatives. The introduction of limited attention changes the positive and normative predictions obtained from otherwise standard models, such as Salop-style competition. Further, the model identifies when limited attention is beneficial or harmful to firms, and explains why the individually rational decision to become less attentive in presence of more choice options may be catalyzed to a collective inattention trap over the market mechanism.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theoryde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectAttentionde_CH
dc.subjectImperfect competitionde_CH
dc.subjectBounded rationalityde_CH
dc.subjectProduct differentiationde_CH
dc.subjectSaliencede_CH
dc.subjectContest theoryde_CH
dc.subject.ddc658.8: Marketingmanagementde_CH
dc.titleLimited attention, competition and welfarede_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitFachstelle für Wirtschaftspolitik (FWP)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.012de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end359de_CH
zhaw.pages.start318de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume178de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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