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dc.contributor.authorGünster, Andrea-
dc.description.abstractCartel existence might evoke three types of inefficiencies according to economic theory: allocative, dynamic and x-inefficiency. We estimate the profitability of international cartels thereby testing for the allocative inefficiency hypothesis. Second, we assess dynamic inefficiency measured by considering investments into R&D. Third, we asses x-inefficiency by considering (labor) productivity. Our research analyzes firm-specific financial data for a sample of 143 firms involved in 50 European cartel infringements that took place between 1983 and 2004 involving internationally operating firms. Our findings support increased profitability showing a significant rise in return on assets during cartel years. Ringleaders are more profitable on average than other cartel members. R&D expenditures over sales and assets measuring dynamic efficiency decrease during the cartel period. Productive efficiency – measured as sales over employees – declines during the cartel phase indicating a “quiet life” effect.de_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc338: Produktionde_CH
dc.titleDo cartels undermine economic efficiency?de_CH
dc.typeKonferenz: Sonstigesde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitFachstelle für Wirtschaftspolitik (FWP)de_CH
zhaw.conference.details2nd Workshop: «Industrial Organization», Otranto, Italy, 23-24 June 2011de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewKeine Begutachtungde_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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