Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game

Shen, Peiyao; Betz, Regina; Ortmann, Andreas; Gong, Rukai

doi:10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0

Publication type:	Article in scientific journal
Type of review:	Peer review (publication)
Title:	Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game
Authors:	Shen, Peiyao Betz, Regina Ortmann, Andreas Gong, Rukai
et. al:	No
DOI:	10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0
Published in:	Environmental and Resource Economics
Volume(Issue):	76
Issue:	2-3
Page(s):	201
Pages to:	233
Issue Date:	2-Apr-2020
Publisher / Ed. Institution:	Springer
ISSN:	0924-6460 1573-1502
Language:	English
Subject (DDC):	333.7: Land, natural recreational areas
Abstract:	We consider a two-layered review system of environmental regulation where a polluting firm periodically self-reports its emissions to a regulatory authority. The system typically requires a third party to verify the firm’s report and, in addition, an official of the regulatory authority to spot-check. If there are potential gains from corruption, both the verifier and the official might be corruptible. Corruption is more likely in repeated-game situations, as suggested by the literature on corruption experiments. Our experimental design is motivated by the risk of under-reporting in emissions trading schemes where both the verifier and the official are corruptible and focuses on a situation with untruthful reporting and lax enforcement. Our test-bed is a three-player bribery game. We study how different types of rotation—a baseline of fixed matching, a complete rotation treatment, and two incomplete rotation treatments—affect untruthful reporting that requires collusion between three participants in a hierarchical structure. Our findings suggest that complete rotation improves significantly firms’ truthful reporting and verifiers’ truthful verification compared to situations where none is rotated, while incomplete rotation does not have such impact. In our experiment, none of the rotation treatments had a significant impact on the behavior of officials.
URI:	https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/19928
Fulltext version:	Published version
License (according to publishing contract):	Licence according to publishing contract
Departement:	School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit:	Center for Energy and Environment (CEE)
Appears in collections:	Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.

Show full item record

Shen, P., Betz, R., Ortmann, A., & Gong, R. (2020). Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 76(2-3), 201–233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0

Shen, P. et al. (2020) ‘Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 76(2-3), pp. 201–233. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0.

P. Shen, R. Betz, A. Ortmann, and R. Gong, “Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game,” Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 76, no. 2-3, pp. 201–233, Apr. 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0.

SHEN, Peiyao, Regina BETZ, Andreas ORTMANN und Rukai GONG, 2020. Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors : experimental evidence from a bribery game. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2 April 2020. Bd. 76, Nr. 2-3, S. 201–233. DOI 10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0

Shen, Peiyao, Regina Betz, Andreas Ortmann, and Rukai Gong. 2020. “Improving Truthful Reporting of Polluting Firms by Rotating Inspectors : Experimental Evidence from a Bribery Game.” Environmental and Resource Economics 76 (2-3): 201–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0.

Shen, Peiyao, et al. “Improving Truthful Reporting of Polluting Firms by Rotating Inspectors : Experimental Evidence from a Bribery Game.” Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 76, no. 2-3, Apr. 2020, pp. 201–33, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00417-0.