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  4. Publikationen School of Management and Law
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dc.contributor.authorBetz, Regina-
dc.contributor.authorGreiner, Ben-
dc.contributor.authorSchweitzer, Sascha-
dc.contributor.authorSeifert, Stefan-
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-15T12:50:13Z-
dc.date.available2018-06-15T12:50:13Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.issn1468-0297de_CH
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/6946-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherOxford University Pressde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofThe Economic Journalde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectEmissions tradingde_CH
dc.subjectAuctionde_CH
dc.subjectExperimentde_CH
dc.subject.ddc380: Verkehrde_CH
dc.titleAuction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental studyde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Energie und Umwelt (CEE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecoj.12403de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue605de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end371de_CH
zhaw.pages.start351de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume127de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
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Betz, R., Greiner, B., Schweitzer, S., & Seifert, S. (2017). Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study. The Economic Journal, 127(605), 351–371. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12403
Betz, R. et al. (2017) ‘Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study’, The Economic Journal, 127(605), pp. 351–371. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12403.
R. Betz, B. Greiner, S. Schweitzer, and S. Seifert, “Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study,” The Economic Journal, vol. 127, no. 605, pp. 351–371, 2017, doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12403.
BETZ, Regina, Ben GREINER, Sascha SCHWEITZER und Stefan SEIFERT, 2017. Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study. The Economic Journal. 2017. Bd. 127, Nr. 605, S. 351–371. DOI 10.1111/ecoj.12403
Betz, Regina, Ben Greiner, Sascha Schweitzer, and Stefan Seifert. 2017. “Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions : An Experimental Study.” The Economic Journal 127 (605): 351–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12403.
Betz, Regina, et al. “Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions : An Experimental Study.” The Economic Journal, vol. 127, no. 605, 2017, pp. 351–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12403.


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