Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Damianov, Damian S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Becker, Johannes Gerd | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-25T12:16:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-07-25T12:16:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0014-2921 | de_CH |
dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/8488 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume | de_CH |
dc.language.iso | en | de_CH |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | de_CH |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Economic Review | de_CH |
dc.rights | Licence according to publishing contract | de_CH |
dc.subject.ddc | 658.8: Marketingmanagement | de_CH |
dc.title | Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory | de_CH |
dc.type | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift | de_CH |
dcterms.type | Text | de_CH |
zhaw.departement | School of Management and Law | de_CH |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002 | de_CH |
zhaw.funding.eu | No | de_CH |
zhaw.issue | 4 | de_CH |
zhaw.originated.zhaw | Yes | de_CH |
zhaw.pages.end | 593 | de_CH |
zhaw.pages.start | 571 | de_CH |
zhaw.publication.status | publishedVersion | de_CH |
zhaw.volume | 2008 | de_CH |
zhaw.publication.review | Peer review (Publikation) | de_CH |
Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law |
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Damianov, D. S., & Becker, J. G. (2009). Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory. European Economic Review, 2008(4), 571–593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002
Damianov, D.S. and Becker, J.G. (2009) ‘Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory’, European Economic Review, 2008(4), pp. 571–593. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
D. S. Damianov and J. G. Becker, “Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory,” European Economic Review, vol. 2008, no. 4, pp. 571–593, 2009, doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
DAMIANOV, Damian S. und Johannes Gerd BECKER, 2009. Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory. European Economic Review. 2009. Bd. 2008, Nr. 4, S. 571–593. DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002
Damianov, Damian S., and Johannes Gerd Becker. 2009. “Auctions with Variable Supply : Uniform Price versus Discriminatory.” European Economic Review 2008 (4): 571–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
Damianov, Damian S., and Johannes Gerd Becker. “Auctions with Variable Supply : Uniform Price versus Discriminatory.” European Economic Review, vol. 2008, no. 4, 2009, pp. 571–93, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
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