Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-9115
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dc.contributor.authorGünster, Andrea Maria-
dc.contributor.authorMartin, Stephen-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T08:48:09Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T08:48:09Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.issn0889-938Xde_CH
dc.identifier.issn1573-7160de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9115-
dc.descriptionErworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch)de_CH
dc.description.abstractOn June 11, 1470, representatives of Pope Paul II and Ferdinand, King of Naples concluded a cartel agreement to restrict competition in the sale of alum. The agreement was one element of a broader plan to monopolize the sale of alum throughout Christendom. We discuss the background of the cartel agreement and analyze its terms (which include arrangements to facilitate detection of and reduce the profitability of defection) and the constraints that limited, but did not eliminate, Rome’s ability to extract economic profit from the European alum market.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherSpringerde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Industrial Organizationde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectCartelde_CH
dc.subjectCollusionde_CH
dc.subjectAlumde_CH
dc.subject.ddc337: Weltwirtschaft und Handelde_CH
dc.subject.ddc900: Geschichtede_CH
dc.titleA holy alliance : collusion in the Renaissance Europe alum marketde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Arbeitsmärkte, Digitalisierung und Regionalökonomie (CLDR)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.21256/zhaw-9115-
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end23de_CH
zhaw.pages.start1de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume47de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Günster, A. M., & Martin, S. (2015). A holy alliance : collusion in the Renaissance Europe alum market. Review of Industrial Organization, 47(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0
Günster, A.M. and Martin, S. (2015) ‘A holy alliance : collusion in the Renaissance Europe alum market’, Review of Industrial Organization, 47(1), pp. 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0.
A. M. Günster and S. Martin, “A holy alliance : collusion in the Renaissance Europe alum market,” Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 1–23, 2015, doi: 10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0.
GÜNSTER, Andrea Maria und Stephen MARTIN, 2015. A holy alliance : collusion in the Renaissance Europe alum market. Review of Industrial Organization. 2015. Bd. 47, Nr. 1, S. 1–23. DOI 10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0
Günster, Andrea Maria, and Stephen Martin. 2015. “A Holy Alliance : Collusion in the Renaissance Europe Alum Market.” Review of Industrial Organization 47 (1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0.
Günster, Andrea Maria, and Stephen Martin. “A Holy Alliance : Collusion in the Renaissance Europe Alum Market.” Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9465-0.


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