Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Transitions in the negotiations on climate change : from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond
Authors: Pittel, Karen
Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-010-9126-6
Published in: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
Volume(Issue): 12
Issue: 1
Page(s): 23
Pages to: 39
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Springer
ISSN: 1567-9764
Language: English
Subjects: Adaption; Climate ahange; First-mover advantage; Prisoner's dilemma game
Subject (DDC): 363: Environmental and security problems
Abstract: Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Center for Economic Policy (FWP)
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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