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dc.contributor.authorSlembeck, Tilman-
dc.contributor.authorTyran, Jean-Robert-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-24T13:32:48Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-24T13:32:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9635-
dc.description.abstractThe three-door problem is an example of a systematic violation of a key rationality postulate that has attracted much attention. In this seemingly simple individual decision task, most people initially fail to apply correctly Bayes’ Law, and to make the payoff-maximizing choice. Previous experimental studies have shown that individual learning reduces the incidence of irrational choices somewhat, but is far from eliminating it. We experimentally study the roles of communication and competition as institutions to mitigate the choice anomaly. We show that the three-door anomaly can be entirely eliminated by these institutions.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Behavior & Organizationde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectCommunicationde_CH
dc.subjectCompetitionde_CH
dc.subjectInstitutionde_CH
dc.subjectLearningde_CH
dc.subjectThree door anomalyde_CH
dc.subjectGroup decision makingde_CH
dc.subjectIndividual decision makingde_CH
dc.subject.ddc150: Psychologiede_CH
dc.subject.ddc330: Wirtschaftde_CH
dc.titleDo institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomalyde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Arbeitsmärkte, Digitalisierung und Regionalökonomie (CLDR)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue3de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end350de_CH
zhaw.pages.start337de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume54de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Slembeck, T., & Tyran, J.-R. (2004). Do institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomaly. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(3), 337–350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002
Slembeck, T. and Tyran, J.-R. (2004) ‘Do institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomaly’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(3), pp. 337–350. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002.
T. Slembeck and J.-R. Tyran, “Do institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomaly,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 337–350, 2004, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002.
SLEMBECK, Tilman und Jean-Robert TYRAN, 2004. Do institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomaly. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2004. Bd. 54, Nr. 3, S. 337–350. DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002
Slembeck, Tilman, and Jean-Robert Tyran. 2004. “Do Institutions Promote Rationality? : An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Anomaly.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 54 (3): 337–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002.
Slembeck, Tilman, and Jean-Robert Tyran. “Do Institutions Promote Rationality? : An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Anomaly.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 54, no. 3, 2004, pp. 337–50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002.


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