Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-28237Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Li, Chuanyun | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Spychiger, Florian | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Tessone, Claudio J. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-11T15:38:25Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-11T15:38:25Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-12-26 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1932-4537 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2373-7379 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/28237 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider the “block withholding attack” as introduced by Eyal, where mining pools may infiltrate others to decrease their revenues. However, when two mining pools attack each other and neither controls a strict majority, the so-called miner’s dilemma arises. Both pools are worse off than without an attack. Knowing this, pools may make implicit non-attack agreements. Having said this, the miner’s dilemma is known to emerge only if no pool controls the majority of the mining power. In this work, we allow for miner migration and show that the miner’s dilemma emerges even for pools whose mining power exceeds 50%. We construct a game, where two mining pools attack each other and use simulation analysis methods to analyze the evolution the pools’ mining power, infiltration preferences and revenue densities under the influence of different mining pool sizes and miner migration preferences. The results show that underlying game experiences a phase transition fueled by miners’ migration preference. Without migration, it is profitable for a large mining pool to attack the other pool. The higher the migration preference of the miners, the more the game transitions into the miner’s dilemma and attacking makes both pools worse off. In a second step, we introduce solo-mining into the system. Introducing solo-mining cannot prevent the miner’s dilemma, however, it improves the efficiency of the mining process as the infiltration preferences of the mining pools are lowered. Thus, solo-mining has a control effect on the miner’s dilemma by keeping the infiltration preference below a certain threshold. | de_CH |
| dc.language.iso | en | de_CH |
| dc.publisher | IEEE | de_CH |
| dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management | de_CH |
| dc.rights | Licence according to publishing contract | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Bitcoin | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Block withholding attack | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Evolutionary game theory | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Miner migration | de_CH |
| dc.subject.ddc | 510: Mathematik | de_CH |
| dc.title | The miner’s dilemma with migration : the control effect of solo-mining | de_CH |
| dc.type | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift | de_CH |
| dcterms.type | Text | de_CH |
| zhaw.departement | School of Management and Law | de_CH |
| zhaw.organisationalunit | Institute for Organizational Viability (IOV) | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.21256/zhaw-28237 | - |
| zhaw.funding.eu | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.issue | 3 | de_CH |
| zhaw.originated.zhaw | Yes | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.end | 2770 | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.start | 2760 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.status | acceptedVersion | de_CH |
| zhaw.volume | 20 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.review | Peer review (Publikation) | de_CH |
| zhaw.author.additional | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.display.portrait | Yes | de_CH |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022_Li-Spychiger-Tessone_The-miners-dilemma-with-migration-control-effect-of-solo-mining_IEEE_AM.pdf | Accepted Version | 4.68 MB | Adobe PDF |  View/Open |
Show simple item record
Li, C., Spychiger, F., & Tessone, C. J. (2022). The miner’s dilemma with migration : the control effect of solo-mining. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, 20(3), 2760–2770. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183
Li, C., Spychiger, F. and Tessone, C.J. (2022) ‘The miner’s dilemma with migration : the control effect of solo-mining’, IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, 20(3), pp. 2760–2770. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183.
C. Li, F. Spychiger, and C. J. Tessone, “The miner’s dilemma with migration : the control effect of solo-mining,” IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 2760–2770, Dec. 2022, doi: 10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183.
LI, Chuanyun, Florian SPYCHIGER und Claudio J. TESSONE, 2022. The miner’s dilemma with migration : the control effect of solo-mining. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management. 26 Dezember 2022. Bd. 20, Nr. 3, S. 2760–2770. DOI 10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183
Li, Chuanyun, Florian Spychiger, and Claudio J. Tessone. 2022. “The Miner’s Dilemma with Migration : The Control Effect of Solo-Mining.” IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management 20 (3): 2760–70. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183.
Li, Chuanyun, et al. “The Miner’s Dilemma with Migration : The Control Effect of Solo-Mining.” IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, vol. 20, no. 3, Dec. 2022, pp. 2760–70, https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3232183.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.